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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 14-1417 
____________ 
 
ALVIN EVANS SEEPAUL, 
     Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
          Respondent 
 __________________________________ 
 
On a Petition For Review of an Order 
of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. (A093-453-590)  
Immigration Judge: Michael W. Straus  
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 19, 2014 
 
Before: SMITH, HARDIMAN and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: December 4, 2014) 
 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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PER CURIAM 
 Petitioner Alvin Evans Seepaul (“Seepaul”) petitions for review of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals’ decision denying his motion to reopen removal proceedings.  For 
the reasons that follow, we will deny the petition for review. 
 Seepaul, a native and citizen of Trinidad and Tobago (hereinafter “Trinidad”), was 
admitted to the United States as a nonimmigrant visitor for pleasure with authorization to 
remain until April 20, 2000.  He overstayed, and was placed in removal proceedings 
pursuant to Immigration & Nationality Act (“INA”) § 237(a)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(1)(B).  Seepaul, who has two U.S. citizen children, Brandon and Kayleigh, 
applied for cancellation of removal for certain nonpermanent residents pursuant to INA § 
240A(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1).  At his merits hearing before an Immigration Judge 
on December 12, 2011, Seepaul emphasized Brandon’s hearing and speech problems as 
the basis for his claim of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to a qualifying 
relative.  Brandon, who was born in 2004, has a hearing impairment that required surgical 
intervention; he now receives speech therapy in school.  Brandon lived with his mother 
when he first started school but Seepaul, who lives with Kayleigh’s mother, maintained 
close contact with Brandon, carries medical insurance for him, and provides for him 
financially.  With respect to Kayleigh, who would return to Trinidad with him and her 
mother, Seepaul feared that she would be in danger as a result of his brother Kelvin’s 
police work.  In the course of Kelvin’s police work, he testified against certain 
individuals who kidnapped and killed an American citizen.  Seepaul testified that Kelvin 
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now lives in Florida with his family.  Seepaul’s other siblings remain in Trinidad, but 
they have moved to a different place because of Kelvin’s participation in the prosecution.  
A.R. 156-58. 
 Following the hearing, the IJ found Seepaul removable as charged and denied his 
application for cancellation of removal, determining that he could not meet the 
“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard, see Matter of Monreal, 23 I. & 
N. Dec. 56 (BIA 2001) (en banc), and Matter of Recinas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 467 (BIA 2002) 
(en banc).  The IJ found that there was little testimony regarding a possible hardship to 
Kayleigh, and the testimony and evidence relating to Brandon was not unusual.  The IJ 
reviewed Brandon’s medical history and found that he is now in regular education 
classes, although he continues to receive speech therapy.  The IJ further found that 
Brandon would remain in the United States with his mother, who was employed full-
time.  The IJ noted Brandon’s mother’s testimony that she fears that Brandon will regress 
if his father is made to leave the country, and she believes that things will be more 
difficult for her and Brandon financially.  The IJ concluded, nevertheless, that, although 
the separation from Seepaul would affect Brandon, separation of this nature is common 
and not unusual.  Importantly, Brandon’s hearing issues were under control and he was 
otherwise doing well in school except for receiving speech therapy.  Seepaul was granted 
voluntary departure, and an order of removal was issued in the alternative. 
 Seepaul appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, contending in general that 
he had met the standard for cancellation of removal, and arguing in particular that the IJ 
had ignored his evidence showing that his move to Trinidad would place Kayleigh in 
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danger, given his brother’s role as a police witness in a notorious murder case; and 
ignored his evidence with respect to the fact that Brandon and Kayleigh would be 
separated from each other by his removal from the United States.   
 On August 20, 2013, the Board dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the IJ that the 
evidence did not establish that Seepaul’s removal from the United States would result in 
exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to either Brandon or Kayleigh.  The Board 
agreed with the IJ that, although the separation would have some effect on Brandon, the 
hardship would not rise to the level of exceptional and extremely unusual.  The Board 
furthered agreed with the IJ that Seepaul’s removal would not result in exceptional and 
extremely unusual hardship to Kayleigh.  The Board reasoned that she had not yet started 
school in the United States and thus would not suffer a separation in that respect; 
moreover, diminished educational opportunities in Trinidad do not satisfy the exceptional 
and extremely unusual hardship test, see Matter of Andazola, 23 I. & N. Dec. 319 (BIA 
2002) (en banc).  In addition, Seepaul, who had the burden of proof, see 8 C.F.R. § 
1240.8(d), had failed to adequately show how his brother’s involvement in prosecuting a 
notorious murder would cause Kayleigh problems in Trinidad.  The Board stated that the 
administrative record showed that Kelvin had worked for an insurance company since 
2008, and that he continues to live in Trinidad without incident.1 
 On October 11, 2013, Seepaul filed a timely motion to reopen with the Board, 8 
C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), contending that he had new evidence in support of his application 
                                              
1 This proved to be a misstatement of the administrative record by the Board which 
Seepaul chose to a address through a motion a to reopen. 
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for cancellation of removal which was previously unavailable; specifically, he had court 
documentation that he had been granted custody of Brandon, and he had an order from an 
Immigration Judge in Miami granting his brother’s application for asylum.  Seepaul 
argued that reopening was warranted because the agency’s hardship determination was 
based on Brandon’s remaining in the U.S. with his mother, but, since the merits hearing, 
she had decided to join the New York City Police Department and had given custody of 
Brandon to Seepaul; Brandon would thus now be leaving the U.S. with him.  
Additionally, since the merits hearing, Kelvin had been granted asylum based on his role 
in prosecuting the notorious murder/kidnapping.  Seepaul contended that the Board erred 
in its original decision in stating that Kelvin continued to live in Trinidad without 
incident. 
 On January 22, 2014, the Board denied the motion to reopen, holding that the new 
evidence proffered with the motion did not meet the requirements for reopening removal 
proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) and Matter of Coelho, 20 I. & N. Dec. 464 
(BIA 1992).  Once again, the Board determined that the hardship that Seepaul had shown 
was not substantially different from that which would normally be expected when a 
parent returns with his children to a less developed country.  Similarly, the Board was not 
persuaded that Kelvin’s recent grant of asylum would affect Brandon and Kayleigh in 
Trinidad.  In sum, the Board concluded that further hearings on Seepaul’s application for 
cancellation of removal were not warranted.  The Board further declined to sua sponte 
reopen proceedings, see Matter of J-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 976 (BIA 1997). 
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 Seepaul has timely petitioned for review.2  We review the Board’s denial of a 
motion to reopen for abuse of discretion.   Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. 
Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992).  “A motion to reopen proceedings shall state the new 
facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be 
supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material....   A motion to reopen proceedings 
shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is 
material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the 
former hearing.”  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).  The Board may deny a motion to reopen 
where the movant has not demonstrated prima facie eligibility for the substantive relief 
sought.  Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 105 (1988).  The 
prima facie standard for a motion to reopen requires the movant to produce objective 
evidence showing a reasonable likelihood that he can establish that he is entitled to relief.  
See Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 175 (3d Cir. 2002).   
 We will deny the petition for review.  Cancellation of removal is available for a 
nonpermanent resident who has been physically present in the U.S. for at least 10 years, 
has been a person of good moral character, has not been convicted of certain crimes, and 
“establishes that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to 
the alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien 
lawfully admitted for permanent residence.”  8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A)-(D).  Congress 
                                              
2 The briefing schedule was stayed for a time while the Department of Homeland 
Security evaluated the case for a possible favorable exercise of prosecutorial discretion.  
The case is now ripe for decision, DHS having declined to exercise discretion in 
Seepaul’s favor. 
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intended that the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard be a stringent one.  
See Andazola, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 322; Recinas, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 470.  Monreal, 23 I. & 
N. Dec. 56, holds that, to establish exceptional and extremely unusual hardship,  the 
applicant must show that the qualifying relative would suffer hardship substantially 
beyond that which would normally result from deportation.  See id. at 59.  See also 
Andazola, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 322.   Nevertheless, the Board will consider “the ages, 
health, and circumstances of qualifying ... relatives.”  Monreal, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 63.  An 
applicant who had a qualifying child “with very serious health issues, or compelling 
special needs in school” would have a strong application.  Id.  See also Mendez v. 
Holder, 566 F.3d 316, 322-23 (2d Cir. 2009) (Board required to consider alien’s 
testimony about his son’s need for highly specialized care, and the difficulty of obtaining 
the necessary care in Mexico, in determining exceptional and extremely unusual 
hardship). 
 With the standard in mind, we conclude that the Board did not abuse its discretion 
in determining that Seepaul did not show in his motion to reopen that he is prima facie 
eligible for cancellation of removal, that is, we conclude that he failed to show a 
reasonable likelihood that he can establish that he is entitled to relief.  See Sevoian, 290 
F.3d at 175.  Seepaul’s new evidence showed that he now has physical custody of 
Brandon, meaning that Brandon will now accompany him and Kayleigh to Trinidad, and 
that his brother Kelvin was awarded asylum based on his fear of those in Trinidad who 
might seek revenge because he testified against their compatriots.  Seepaul’s first 
argument concerning Brandon, see Petitioner’s Informal Brief, at 3, does not persuasively 
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establish a prima facie case for cancellation of removal based on exceptional and 
extremely unusual hardship.  Brandon will now not be separated from Seepaul and 
Kayleigh, and, although he has had speech and hearing problems, and will likely continue 
to need speech services in Trinidad, Seepaul failed to offer evidence with his motion to 
reopen regarding education in Trinidad, or evidence to show that Brandon’s hearing and 
speech needs cannot be met in Trinidad.  Seepaul has the burden to prove his eligibility 
for cancellation of removal, 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d), which means that he has the burden to 
make a prima facie showing that Brandon will continue to have serious health issues and 
will need medical care or specialized services that cannot be obtained in Trinidad.  
Monreal, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 63; Mendez, 566 F.3d at 322-23.  He did not meet this 
evidentiary burden in his motion to reopen.  Seepaul’s second argument concerning his 
fear that Brandon and Kayleigh will be harmed because of their uncle’s testimony, see 
Petitioner’s Informal Brief, at 3, also does not provide a basis for reopening the removal 
proceedings.  The item he attached to his motion to reopen, an Immigration Judge’s 
summary order granting asylum, provides no information about the basis for the IJ’s 
grant of relief to Kelvin Seepaul.  More specifically, it provides no information to support 
a claim that Kelvin’s extended family, including Seepaul, Brandon, and Kayleigh, has 
any reason to fear those individuals who would seek to harm Kelvin because of Kelvin’s 
role in the prosecution of the murder/kidnapping case.  Again, Seepaul has the burden of 
proof on this issue, 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d). 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
